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Quantum Computing and Blockchain Security: Lessons From the Biggest Crypto Hacks of 2025–26

The 5 biggest crypto hacks of 2025 and 2026 broke signing systems, not cryptography. What quantum computing changes and how infra teams should prepare.

Quantum Computing and Blockchain Security: Lessons From the Biggest Crypto Hacks of 2025–26

By Instanodes Team

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$8.8 Billion in Five Hacks, and the Wrong Question

On September 24, 2026, Bitget lost about $387.5 million from its hot and warm wallets across seven networks. Five weeks later, on October 29, roughly $6.36 billion moved out of Binance wallets on ten blockchains, most of it in about 20 minutes. That is the largest crypto theft on record, about four times the Bybit hack of February 2025.

Since then, one question keeps surfacing in builder chats: could quantum computing have stopped this? Short answer: no. None of the five biggest crypto hacks of the last two years broke any cryptography. Quantum computing is the next attack surface for crypto, and post-quantum cryptography is the defense against it.

The useful version of the question is different. What failed in 2026, what quantum computers will break later, and what infrastructure teams should change now so they are not explaining either one in a post-mortem.

The 5 Biggest Crypto Hacks of 2025 and 2026

Together these five account for roughly $8.8 billion. Every one of them hit a system around the keys: a signing service, a wallet interface, a backend, an RPC node or a human signer. Investigators or the FBI have linked all five to North Korean groups.

IncidentDateLossWhat failedCrypto broken?
BinanceOct 29, 2026$6.36BHot wallet signing infrastructureNo
BybitFeb 21, 2025$1.5BMultisig wallet interface showed signers a disguised transactionNo
BitgetSep 24, 2026$387.5MWallet backend, entered via a third-party security productNo
Kelp DAOApr 18, 2026$292MRPC nodes behind a single bridge verifierNo
Drift ProtocolApr 1, 2026$285MSocial engineering of multisig signersNo

1. Binance: $6.36 billion

Attackers took control of the signing infrastructure behind Binance's hot wallets and moved about $6.36 billion across ten chains, including Ethereum, Bitcoin, Tron, Solana and the XRP Ledger, most of it in roughly 20 minutes. TRM Labs found staging activity well before the theft. The FBI attributed it to North Korea's TraderTraitor group. About $3 billion was frozen within days.

2. Bybit: $1.5 billion

The previous record. Attackers compromised the interface Bybit's signers used to approve a routine cold-to-warm wallet transfer. The signers saw a normal transaction and signed one that handed control of the wallet to the attacker. Every signature was valid.

3. Bitget: $387.5 million

Bitget's CEO said the attacker compromised a backend system inside the wallet infrastructure, spoofed transaction data and triggered the exchange's own authorization process. Halborn traced the entry point to a third-party security product, with losses across seven networks. No private keys were stolen.

4. Kelp DAO: $292 million

The largest DeFi exploit of 2026. Kelp's LayerZero bridge relied on a single verifier, and attackers compromised the RPC nodes that verifier read from. Fed false chain data, it approved a forged cross-chain message that released about $292 million in unbacked rsETH. For infra teams this one hits closest to home: an RPC node is part of the security perimeter. More on that in our guide to choosing a dedicated RPC node provider.

5. Drift Protocol: $285 million

No code bug at all. Attackers spent months building trust with Drift's multisig signers, then used Solana durable nonces to get pre-signed admin transactions that they executed later. Mandiant linked the attack to North Korea.

The pattern

  • The weak point sits off-chain. Backends, wallet interfaces, approval services and the people who sign.
  • Trust boundaries leak. A vendor product, a front-end and a set of RPC nodes each became a path into production.
  • Pre-signed transactions are loaded weapons. Binance and Drift both turned signatures obtained in advance into instant drains.
  • Infrastructure is the attack surface. Kelp DAO showed that whoever controls the node controls what a protocol believes is true.

A quantum computer would not have changed any of these outcomes. Isolation, independent verification and monitoring around signing would have.

Running bridges, oracles or exchange backends? Ask us about isolated, dedicated RPC for them.

Talk to an expert

Where Quantum Computing Actually Threatens Crypto

A large enough quantum computer breaks the signature schemes most chains run on today. No such machine exists yet, and per ethereum.org no quantum computer can break Ethereum's cryptography today (ethereum.org).

The estimate is moving the wrong way, though. In March 2026, Google Quantum AI published a paper estimating that breaking 256-bit elliptic curve cryptography could take roughly 1,200 logical qubits, about 20 times fewer than earlier estimates.

PrimitiveWhere it livesQuantum attackImpact
ECDSA (secp256k1), Ed25519User accounts, exchange hot wallets, Bitcoin and EVM transactionsShor's algorithm recovers private keys from public keysBreaks. Funds behind exposed public keys can be stolen
BLS signaturesEthereum validator consensusShor's algorithmBreaks. Needs a post-quantum replacement
KZG commitmentsEthereum data availabilityRelies on elliptic curve pairingsBreaks. Needs a post-quantum replacement
SHA-256, KeccakHashing, addresses, proof of workGrover's algorithm gives a quadratic speed-upWeakened, not broken. 256-bit output keeps a wide margin
TLS key exchange (ECDHE)RPC traffic, internal APIs, custody commsShor's algorithmHarvest now, decrypt later: traffic recorded today can be read once Q-Day arrives

Two exposure windows matter.

  • Exposed public keys. A Bitcoin address that has spent, or an EVM account that has sent a transaction, has its public key on-chain. Q-Day turns every one of those into a recoverable private key. One estimate puts about 6.9 million BTC in addresses exposed this way.
  • Recorded traffic. Encrypted RPC calls, API keys in transit and internal signing requests captured today can be decrypted later. Signing pipelines like the ones hit in 2026 carry exactly this kind of traffic.

Put the two together and the 2026 lesson gets sharper. Attackers already target the signing path. Quantum adds a second way in: forge the signature itself.

Post-Quantum Readiness in Late 2026

The standards exist. Major chains have roadmaps, not live protocol-wide post-quantum signatures.

NIST finalized its first post-quantum standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key exchange, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for signatures. These are the primitives chains and infra providers will migrate to.

NetworkStatus as of late 2026Target
EthereumPost-Quantum Security team formed January 2026; weekly post-quantum interop devnets running (ethereum.org). Upgrades needed across BLS, KZG, ECDSA accounts and ZK proof systemsCore milestones around 2029
BitcoinFirst quantum-resistant address format proposal, BIP-360, merged early 2026; migration not completeNo fixed date
XRP LedgerFour-phase roadmap published April 2026 (Quantum Zeitgeist)Full transition by 2028

For anyone running nodes or validators, this means a multi-year series of client upgrades, new key types, parallel key registries and key rotations. Each one is an operational event. Each one is also a window where a rushed upgrade or a sloppy key ceremony creates the kind of opening attackers exploited in 2026. If you run your own infrastructure, our guides to deploying an Ethereum node and how Bitcoin nodes work cover what each upgrade touches.

A Quantum-Ready Security Checklist for Infra Teams

Most of what protects you from a 2026-style breach also prepares you for post-quantum migration. Start with the signing path.

Now: close the gaps the 2026 hacks used

  1. Isolate signing infrastructure from general backends. No shared credentials, no shared network segments, no vendor agent with a route into the signer.
  2. Verify transaction intent independently. The approval system should rebuild and check what it signs from on-chain state, not trust payloads from an upstream service or a wallet interface.
  3. Run dedicated, single-tenant nodes for deposits, withdrawals, bridge verification and broadcasting. Shared endpoints add a dependency you cannot audit, as covered in reducing counterparty exposure in RPC infrastructure. Where a verifier reads chain state, use more than one independent node source.
  4. Expire or forbid long-lived pre-signed transactions, and alert on withdrawal velocity and destination anomalies. A 20-minute drain needs detection measured in seconds.
  5. Keep validator signing and withdrawal credentials under your own control. Whoever operates the infrastructure should never hold the keys. Our Validator-as-a-Service buyer's guide lists what to check.

Need single-tenant nodes for that signing path? Dedicated Clusters run deposit, withdrawal and broadcast traffic on infrastructure no one else shares.

Next: prepare for post-quantum migration

  1. Build a cryptographic inventory. List every place your stack uses ECDSA, Ed25519, BLS and ECDHE: wallets, validators, RPC TLS, internal APIs.
  2. Stop reusing addresses and rotate exposed keys on a schedule. Exposed public keys are the first quantum target.
  3. Track client releases on every chain you run. Post-quantum changes will ship as forks and new key types, and a node that lags a fork drops off the network.
  4. Pilot hybrid TLS (classical plus ML-KEM) on internal and RPC traffic where your stack supports it, to cut harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure.
  5. Plan key ceremonies for new post-quantum key types now, with the same isolation rules as step 1.

Our engineers map every quantum-vulnerable dependency in your stack and hand you a migration roadmap.

Book a quantum-readiness assessment

Quantum-Ready Infrastructure, Live Today

The checklist has two halves: protect the accounts that sign, and harden the systems around them. Instanodes now covers both. In November 2026 we launched post-quantum accounts for Ethereum and Solana alongside quantum-readiness services (press release).

Post-quantum security

  • Post-quantum accounts: hash-based signature implementations for EVM-compatible chains and Solana. On Ethereum, verification runs inside ERC-4337 smart accounts. On Solana, it runs through program-level signature verification and asset controls. Built to plug into wallet, custody and protocol architectures.
  • Quantum-readiness assessments: a review of your cryptographic dependencies, the quantum-vulnerable components in your stack, and a structured migration roadmap.
  • Custom cryptographic engineering: for custody flows and account models that need bespoke work.

Hardened infrastructure

  • Dedicated Clusters: single-tenant infrastructure with contracted throughput, custom SLAs and multi-region failover for deposit, withdrawal and broadcast traffic.
  • Validator-as-a-Service: slashing protection, monitoring and 24/7 alerting under a non-custodial policy. Signing and withdrawal credentials stay with the client, always.
  • Node-as-a-Service: managed full, archive and dedicated RPC nodes across 50+ chains, with network upgrades handled by the operator. Weighing managed against self-hosted? Start with our Node-as-a-Service guide.
  • Verified posture: SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001 and a contractual 99.95% uptime SLA you can check live on our node status page.

Post-quantum migration will run for years. The teams that handle it well will be the ones that start with an inventory, not an incident.

Building an exchange, custody stack or protocol? Talk to our engineering team about post-quantum accounts.

Ask about post-quantum accounts

FAQ

What were the biggest crypto hacks of 2025 and 2026?

Binance (about $6.36 billion, October 2026), Bybit (about $1.5 billion, February 2025), Bitget (about $387.5 million, September 2026), Kelp DAO (about $292 million, April 2026) and Drift Protocol (about $285 million, April 2026). None involved broken cryptography.

Can exchanges and protocols use post-quantum accounts today?

Yes. Smart-account standards such as ERC-4337 allow custom signature validation, so hash-based post-quantum signatures can authorize accounts on Ethereum now. Instanodes offers post-quantum account implementations for EVM-compatible chains and Solana, plus quantum-readiness assessments.

Can quantum computing prevent crypto hacks?

No. Quantum computers are a future threat to the signature schemes crypto uses. The defense is post-quantum cryptography: new signature and key exchange algorithms such as ML-DSA and ML-KEM that resist quantum attacks.

Was the 2026 Binance hack caused by quantum computing?

No. Investigators link it to a compromise of hot wallet signing infrastructure, with signatures obtained in advance and executed in one burst. No cryptographic algorithm was broken.

How did the Bitget hack happen?

Attackers compromised a backend system in Bitget's wallet infrastructure, spoofed transaction data and triggered the exchange's own approval process. Bitget says no private keys were stolen.

When will quantum computers break Bitcoin and Ethereum?

No current machine can. A March 2026 Google Quantum AI estimate put the requirement for breaking 256-bit elliptic curve cryptography at roughly 1,200 logical qubits. Ethereum targets core post-quantum milestones around 2029.

What is harvest now, decrypt later?

Attackers record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once quantum computers can break the key exchange. RPC calls, API keys and internal signing requests are all candidates.

What should exchanges and validators do first?

Isolate and monitor the signing path, keep keys under their own control, inventory where they use quantum-vulnerable cryptography, and plan for multi-year client upgrades.

Written by

SP

Shivam Pandiya

Product Owner

Content specialist with 5+ years of experience across diverse niches, currently focused on Web3 infrastructure, nodes, rollups, and appchains.